The New Yorker: PRINTABLES

KNOWING THE = ENEMY

by GEORGE PACKER

Can social scientists redefine = the =93war on=20 terror=94?

Issue of = 2006-12-18
Posted=20 = 2006-12-11

In 1993, a young captain in the = Australian Army=20 named David Kilcullen was living among villagers in West = Java, as=20 part of an immersion program in the Indonesian language. One = day, he=20 visited a local military museum that contained a display = about=20 Indonesia=92s war, during the nineteen-fifties and sixties, = against a=20 separatist Muslim insurgency movement called Darul Islam. = =93I had=20 never heard of this conflict,=94 Kilcullen told me recently. = =93It=92s=20 hardly known in the West. The Indonesian government won, = hands down.=20 And I was fascinated by how it managed to pull off such a = successful=20 counterinsurgency campaign.=94

Kilcullen, the son of two left-leaning academics, had = studied=20 counterinsurgency as a cadet at Duntroon, the Australian = West Point,=20 and he decided to pursue a doctorate in political = anthropology at=20 the University of New South Wales. He chose as his = dissertation=20 subject the Darul Islam conflict, conducting research over = tea with=20 former guerrillas while continuing to serve in the = Australian Army.=20 The rebel movement, he said, was bigger than the Malayan=20 Emergency=97the twelve-year Communist revolt against British = rule,=20 which was finally put down in 1960, and which has become a = major=20 point of reference in the military doctrine of = counterinsurgency.=20 During the years that Kilcullen worked on his dissertation, = two=20 events in Indonesia deeply affected his thinking. The first = was the=20 rise=97in the same region that had given birth to Darul = Islam, and=20 among some of the same families=97of a more extreme Islamist = movement=20 called Jemaah Islamiya, which became a Southeast Asian = affiliate of=20 Al Qaeda. The second was East Timor=92s successful struggle = for=20 independence from Indonesia. Kilcullen witnessed the former = as he=20 was carrying out his field work; he participated in the = latter as an=20 infantry-company commander in a United Nations intervention = force.=20 The experiences shaped the conclusions about = counter-insurgency in=20 his dissertation, which he finished in 2001, just as a new = war was=20 about to begin.

=93I saw extremely similar behavior and extremely similar = problems=20 in an Islamic insurgency in West Java and a = Christian-separatist=20 insurgency in East Timor,=94 he said. =93After 9/11, when a = lot of=20 people were saying, =91The problem is Islam,=92 I was = thinking, It=92s=20 something deeper than that. It=92s about human social = networks and the=20 way that they operate.=94 In West Java, elements of the = failed Darul=20 Islam insurgency=97a local separatist movement with mystical = leanings=97had resumed fighting as Jemaah Islamiya, whose = outlook was=20 Salafist and global. Kilcullen said, =93What that told me = about Jemaah=20 Islamiya is that it=92s not about theology.=94 He went on, = =93There are=20 elements in human psychological and social makeup that drive = what=92s=20 happening. The Islamic bit is secondary. This is human = behavior in=20 an Islamic setting. This is not =91Islamic behavior.=92 =94 = Paraphrasing=20 the American political scientist Roger D. Petersen, he said, = =93People=20 don=92t get pushed into rebellion by their ideology. They = get pulled=20 in by their social networks.=94 He noted that all fifteen = Saudi=20 hijackers in the September 11th plot had trouble with their = fathers.=20 Although radical ideas prepare the way for disaffected young = men to=20 become violent jihadists, the reasons they convert, = Kilcullen said,=20 are more mundane and familiar: family, friends, = associates.

Indonesia=92s failure to replicate in East Timor its = victory in=20 West Java later influenced Kilcullen=92s views about what = the Bush=20 Administration calls the =93global war on terror.=94 In both = instances,=20 the Indonesian military used the same harsh techniques, = including=20 forced population movements, coercion of locals into = security=20 forces, stringent curfews, and even lethal pressure on = civilians to=20 take the government side. The reason that the effort in East = Timor=20 failed, Kilcullen concluded, was globalization. In the late=20 nineties, a Timorese international propaganda campaign and=20 ubiquitous media coverage prompted international = intervention, thus=20 ending the use of tactics that, in the obscure jungles of = West Java=20 in the fifties, outsiders had known nothing about. =93The = globalized=20 information environment makes counterinsurgency even more = difficult=20 now,=94 Kilcullen said.

Just before the 2004 American elections, Kilcullen was = doing=20 intelligence work for the Australian government, sifting = through=20 Osama bin Laden=92s public statements, including transcripts = of a=20 video that offered a list of grievances against America: = Palestine,=20 Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, global warming. The last item = brought=20 Kilcullen up short. =93I thought, Hang on! What kind of = jihadist are=20 you?=94 he recalled. The odd inclusion of environmentalist = rhetoric,=20 he said, made clear that =93this wasn=92t a list of genuine = grievances.=20 This was an Al Qaeda information = strategy.=94 Ron Suskind, in his book =93The One Percent = Doctrine,=94=20 claims that analysts at the C.I.A. watched a similar video, = released=20 in 2004, and concluded that =93bin Laden=92s message was = clearly=20 designed to assist the President=92s re=EBlection.=94 Bin = Laden shrewdly=20 created an implicit association between Al Qaeda and the = Democratic=20 Party, for he had come to feel that Bush=92s strategy in the = war on=20 terror was sustaining his own global importance. Indeed, in = the=20 years after September 11th Al Qaeda=92s core leadership had = become a=20 propaganda hub. =93If bin Laden didn=92t have access to = global media,=20 satellite communications, and the Internet, he=92d just be a = cranky=20 guy in a cave,=94 Kilcullen said.

In 2004, Kilcullen=92s writings and lectures brought him = to the=20 attention of an official working for Paul Wolfowitz, then = the Deputy=20 Secretary of Defense. Wolfowitz asked him to help write the = section=20 on =93irregular warfare=94 in the Pentagon=92s = =93Quadrennial Defense=20 Review,=94 a statement of department policy and priorities, = which was=20 published earlier this year. Under the leadership of Donald=20 Rumsfeld, who resigned in November, the Pentagon had = embraced a=20 narrow =93shock-and-awe=94 approach to war-fighting, = emphasizing=20 technology, long-range firepower, and spectacular displays = of force.=20 The new document declared that activities such as = =93long-duration=20 unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, = and=20 military support for stabilization and reconstruction = efforts=94=20 needed to become a more important component of the war on = terror.=20 Kilcullen was partly responsible for the inclusion of the = phrase=20 =93the long war,=94 which has become the preferred term = among many=20 military officers to describe the current conflict. In the = end, the=20 Rumsfeld Pentagon was unwilling to make the cuts in = expensive=20 weapons systems that would have allowed it to create new = combat=20 units and other resources necessary for a proper = counterinsurgency=20 strategy.

In July, 2005, Kilcullen, as a result of his work on the = Pentagon=20 document, received an invitation to attend a conference on = defense=20 policy, in Vermont. There he met Henry Crumpton, a highly = regarded=20 official who had supervised the C.I.A.=92s covert activities = in=20 Afghanistan during the 2001 military campaign that overthrew = the=20 Taliban. The two men spent much of the conference talking = privately,=20 and learned, among other things, that they saw the war on = terror in=20 the same way. Soon afterward, Condoleezza Rice, the = Secretary of=20 State, hired Crumpton as the department=92s co=F6rdinator = for=20 counterterrorism, and Crumpton, in turn, offered Kilcullen a = job.=20 For the past year, Kilcullen has occupied an office on the = State=20 Department=92s second floor, as Crumpton=92s chief = strategist. In some=20 senses, Kilcullen has arrived too late: this year, the = insurgency in=20 Iraq has been transformed into a calamitous civil war = between Sunnis=20 and Shiites, and his ideas about counterinsurgency are = unlikely to=20 reverse the country=92s disintegration. Yet radical Islamist = movements=20 now extend across the globe, from Somalia to Afghanistan and = Indonesia, and Kilcullen=97an Australian anthropologist and = lieutenant=20 colonel, who is =93on loan=94 to the U.S. = government=97offers a new way to=20 understand and fight a war that seems to grow less = intelligible the=20 longer it goes on.

Kilcullen is thirty-nine years old, and = has a=20 wide pink face, a fondness for desert boots, and an = Australian=92s=20 good-natured bluntness. He has a talent for making = everything sound=20 like common sense by turning disturbing explanations into = brisk,=20 cheerful questions: =93America is very, very good at big, = short=20 conventional wars? It=92s not very good at small, long wars? = But it=92s=20 even worse at big, long wars? And that=92s what we=92ve = got.=94=20 Kilcullen=92s heroes are soldier-intellectuals, both real = (T. E.=20 Lawrence) and fictional (Robert Jordan, the flinty, = self-reliant=20 schoolteacher turned guerrilla who is the protagonist of = Hemingway=92s=20 =93For Whom the Bell Tolls=94). On his bookshelves, = alongside monographs=20 by social scientists such as Max Gluckman and E. E. = Evans-Pritchard,=20 is a knife that he took from a militiaman he had just = ambushed in=20 East Timor. =93If I were a Muslim, I=92d probably be a = jihadist,=94=20 Kilcullen said as we sat in his office. =93The thing that = drives these=20 guys=97a sense of adventure, wanting to be part of the = moment, wanting=20 to be in the big movement of history that=92s happening = now=97that=92s the=20 same thing that drives me, you know?=94

More than three years into the Iraq war and five into the = conflict in Afghanistan, many members of the American=20 military=97especially those with combat experience=97have = begun to=20 accept the need to learn the kind of counterinsurgency = tactics that=20 it tried to leave behind in Vietnam. On December 15th, the = Army and=20 the Marine Corps will release an ambitious new = counterinsurgency=20 field manual=97the first in more than two decades=97that = will shape=20 military doctrine for many years. The introduction to the = field=20 manual says, =93Effective insurgents rapidly adapt to = changing=20 circumstances. They cleverly use the tools of the global = information=20 revolution to magnify the effects of their actions. . . . = However,=20 by focusing on efforts to secure the safety and support of = the local=20 populace, and through a concerted effort to truly function = as=20 learning organizations, the Army and Marine Corps can defeat = their=20 insurgent enemies.=94

One night earlier this year, Kilcullen sat down with a = bottle of=20 single-malt Scotch and wrote out a series of tips for = company=20 commanders about to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. He = is an=20 energetic writer who avoids military and social-science = jargon, and=20 he addressed himself intimately to young captains who have = had to=20 become familiar with exotica such as =93The Battle of = Algiers,=94 the=20 1966 film documenting the insurgency against French = colonists. =93What=20 does all the theory mean, at the company level?=94 he asked. = =93How do=20 the principles translate into action=97at night, with the = G.P.S. down,=20 the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a = language you=20 don=92t understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people = by ones=20 and twos? How does counterinsurgency actually happen? There = are no=20 universal answers, and insurgents are among the most = adaptive=20 opponents you will ever face. Countering them will demand = every=20 ounce of your intellect.=94 The first tip is =93Know Your = Turf=94: =93Know=20 the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and = culture.=20 Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal = leader,=20 and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world = expert on=20 your district.=94 =93Twenty-eight Articles: Fundamentals of=20 Company-Level Counterinsurgency=94=97the title riffs on a T. = E. Lawrence=20 insurgency manual from the First World War=97was = disseminated via=20 e-mail to junior officers in the field, and was avidly read. =

Last year, in an influential article in the Journal of Strategic Studies, = Kilcullen=20 redefined the war on terror as a =93global = counterinsurgency.=94 The=20 change in terminology has large implications. A terrorist is = =93a kook=20 in a room,=94 Kilcullen told me, and beyond persuasion; an = insurgent=20 has a mass base whose support can be won or lost through = politics.=20 The notion of a =93war on terror=94 has led the U.S. = government to focus=20 overwhelmingly on military responses. In a = counterinsurgency,=20 according to the classical doctrine, which was first laid = out by the=20 British general Sir Gerald Templar during the Malayan = Emergency,=20 armed force is only a quarter of the effort; political, = economic,=20 and informational operations are also required. A war on = terror=20 suggests an undifferentiated enemy. Kilcullen speaks of the = need to=20 =93disaggregate=94 insurgencies: finding ways to address = local=20 grievances in Pakistan=92s tribal areas or along the = Thai-Malay border=20 so that they aren=92t mapped onto the ambitions of the = global jihad.=20 Kilcullen writes, =93Just as the Containment strategy was = central to=20 the Cold War, likewise a Disaggregation strategy would = provide a=20 unifying strategic conception for the war=97something that = has been=20 lacking to date.=94 As an example of disaggregation, = Kilcullen cited=20 the Indonesian province of Aceh, where, after the 2004 = tsunami, a=20 radical Islamist organization tried to set up an office and = convert=20 a local separatist movement to its ideological agenda. = Resentment=20 toward the outsiders, combined with the swift humanitarian = action of=20 American and Australian warships, helped to prevent the = Acehnese=20 rebellion from becoming part of the global jihad. As for = America,=20 this success had more to do with luck than with strategy. = Crumpton,=20 Kilcullen=92s boss, told me that American foreign policy = traditionally=20 operates on two levels, the global and the national; today, = however,=20 the battlefields are also regional and local, where the U.S. = government has less knowledge and where it is not = institutionally=20 organized to act. In half a dozen critical regions, Crumpton = has=20 organized meetings among American diplomats, intelligence = officials,=20 and combat commanders, so that information about = cross-border=20 terrorist threats is shared. =93It=92s really important that = we define=20 the enemy in narrow terms,=94 Crumpton said. =93The thing we = should not=20 do is let our fears grow and then inflate the threat. The = threat is=20 big enough without us having to exaggerate it.=94

By speaking of Saddam Hussein, the Sunni insurgency in = Iraq, the=20 Taliban, the Iranian government, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda in = terms of=20 one big war, Administration officials and ideologues have = made Osama=20 bin Laden=92s job much easier. =93You don=92t play to the = enemy=92s global=20 information strategy of making it all one fight,=94 = Kilcullen said. He=20 pointedly avoided describing this as the Administration=92s = approach.=20 =93You say, =91Actually, there are sixty different groups in = sixty=20 different countries who all have different objectives. = Let=92s not=20 talk about bin Laden=92s objectives=97let=92s talk about = your objectives. How do we solve that = problem?=92=20 =94 In other words, the global ambitions of the enemy = don=92t=20 automatically demand a monolithic response.

The more Kilcullen travels to the = various=20 theatres of war, the less he thinks that the lessons of = Malaya and=20 Vietnam are useful guides in the current conflict. = =93Classical=20 counterinsurgency is designed to defeat insurgency in one = country,=94=20 he writes in his Strategic = Studies=20 article. =93We need a new paradigm, capable of addressing = globalised=20 insurgency.=94 After a recent trip to Afghanistan, where = Taliban=20 forces have begun to mount large operations in the = Pashto-speaking=20 south of the country, he told me, =93This ain=92t your = granddaddy=92s=20 counterinsurgency.=94 Many American units there, he said, = are=20 executing the new field manual=92s tactics brilliantly. For = example,=20 before conducting operations in a given area, soldiers sit = down over=20 bread and tea with tribal leaders and find out what they=20 need=97Korans, cold-weather gear, a hydroelectric dynamo. In = exchange=20 for promises of local support, the Americans gather the = supplies and=20 then, within hours of the end of fighting, produce them, to = show=20 what can be gained from co=F6perating.

But the Taliban seem to be waging a different war, driven = entirely by information operations. =93They=92re essentially = armed=20 propaganda organizations,=94 Kilcullen said. =93They switch = between=20 guerrilla activity and terrorist activity as they need to, = in order=20 to maintain the political momentum, and it=92s all about an=20 information operation that generates the perception of an=20 unstoppable, growing insurgency.=94 After travelling through = southern=20 Afghanistan, Kilcullen e-mailed me:

One good example of = Taliban=20 information strategy is their use of =93night letters.=94 = They have been=20 pushing local farmers in several provinces (Helmand, = Uruzgan,=20 Kandahar) to grow poppy instead of regular crops, and using=20 night-time threats and intimidation to punish those who = don=92t and=20 convince others to convert to poppy. This is not because = they need=20 more opium=97God knows they already have enough=97but = because they=92re=20 trying to detach the local people from the legal economy and = the=20 legally approved governance system of the provinces and = districts,=20 to weaken the hold of central and provincial government. Get = the=20 people doing something illegal, and they=92re less likely to = feel able=20 to support the government, and more willing to do other = illegal=20 things (e.g. join the insurgency)=97this is a classic old = Bolshevik=20 tactic from the early cold war, by the way. They are = specifically=20 trying to send the message: =93The government can neither = help you nor=20 hurt us. We can hurt you, or protect you=97the choice is = yours.=94 They=20 also use object lessons, making an example of people who = don=92t=20 cooperate=97for example, dozens of provincial-level = officials have=20 been assassinated this year, again as an =93armed = propaganda=94 tool=97not=20 because they want one official less but because they want to = send=20 the message =93We can reach out and touch you if you cross = us.=94=20 Classic armed information operation.

Kilcullen doesn=92t believe that an entirely =93soft=94=20 counterinsurgency approach can work against such tactics. In = his=20 view, winning hearts and minds is not a matter of making = local=20 people like you=97as some = American initiates=20 to counterinsurgency whom I met in Iraq seemed to = believe=97but of=20 getting them to accept that supporting your side is in their = interest, which requires an element of coercion. Kilcullen = met=20 senior European officers with the NATO=20 force in Afghanistan who seemed to be applying =93a = development model=20 to counterinsurgency,=94 hoping that gratitude for good work = would=20 bring the Afghans over to their side. He told me, =93In a=20 counterinsurgency, the gratitude effect will last until the = sun goes=20 down and the insurgents show up and say, =91You=92re on our = side, aren=92t=20 you? Otherwise, we=92re going to kill you.=92 If one side is = willing to=20 apply lethal force to bring the population to its side and = the other=20 side isn=92t, ultimately you=92re going to find yourself = losing.=94=20 Kilcullen was describing a willingness to show local people = that=20 supporting the enemy risks harm and hardship, not a campaign = like=20 the Phoenix program in Vietnam, in which noncombatants were=20 assassinated; besides being unethical, such a tactic would=20 inevitably backfire in the age of globalized information.=20 Nevertheless, because he talks about war with an analyst=92s = rationalism and a practitioner=92s matter-of-factness, = Kilcullen can=20 appear deceptively detached from its consequences.

An information strategy seems to be driving the agenda of = every=20 radical Islamist movement. Kilcullen noted that when = insurgents=20 ambush an American convoy in Iraq, =93they=92re not doing = that because=20 they want to reduce the number of Humvees we have in Iraq by = one.=20 They=92re doing it because they want spectacular media = footage of a=20 burning Humvee.=94 Last year, a letter surfaced that is = believed to=20 have been sent from Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden=92s deputy, = to the=20 leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, nine = months before=20 Zarqawi=92s death; the letter urged Zarqawi to make his = videotaped=20 beheadings and mass slaughter of Shiite civilians less = gruesome.=20 Kilcullen interpreted the letter as =93basically saying to = Zarqawi,=20 =91Justify your attacks on the basis of how they support our = information strategy.=92 =94 As soon as the recent fighting = in Lebanon=20 between Hezbollah and Israeli troops ended, Hezbollah = marked, with=20 its party flags, houses that had been damaged. Kilcullen = said,=20 =93That=92s not a reconstruction operation=97it=92s an = information=20 operation. It=92s influence. They=92re going out there to = send a couple=20 of messages. To the Lebanese people they=92re saying, = =91We=92re going to=20 take care of you.=92 To all the aid agencies it=92s like a = dog pissing=20 on trees: they=92re saying, =91We own this house=97don=92t = you touch it.=92 =94=20 He went on, =93When the aid agencies arrive a few days = later, they=20 have to negotiate with Hezbollah because there=92s a = Hezbollah flag on=20 the house. Hezbollah says, =91Yeah, you can sell a contract = to us to=20 fix up that house.=92 It=92s an information operation. = They=92re trying to=20 generate influence.=94

The result is an intimidated or motivated population, and = a spike=20 in fund-raising and recruiting. =93When you go on YouTube = and look at=20 one of these attacks in Iraq, all you see is the video,=94 = Kilcullen=20 said. =93If you go to some jihadist Web sites, you see the = same video=20 and then a button next to it that says, =91Click here and = donate.=92 =94=20 The Afghan or Iraqi or Lebanese insurgent, unlike his = Vietnamese or=20 Salvadoran predecessor, can plug into a global media network = that=20 will instantly amplify his message. After Kilcullen returned = from=20 Afghanistan last month, he stayed up late one Saturday night = (=93because I have no social life=94) and calculated how = many sources of=20 information existed for a Vietnamese villager in 1966 and = for an=20 Afghan villager in 2006. He concluded that the former had = ten,=20 almost half under government control, such as Saigon radio = and local=20 officials; the latter has twenty-five (counting the Internet = as only=20 one), of which just five are controlled by the government. = Most of=20 the rest=97including e-mail, satellite phone, and text = messaging=97are=20 independent but more easily exploited by insurgents than by = the=20 Afghan government. And it is on the level of influencing = perceptions=20 that these wars will be won or lost. =93The international = information=20 environment is critical to the success of America=92s = mission,=94=20 Kilcullen said.

In the information war, America and its allies are barely = competing. America=92s information operations, far from = being the=20 primary strategy, simply support military actions, and often = badly:=20 a Pentagon spokesman announces a battle victory, but no one = in the=20 area of the battlefield hears him (or would believe him = anyway).=20 Just as the Indonesians failed in East Timor, in spite of = using=20 locally successful tactics, Kilcullen said, =93We=92ve done = a similar=20 thing in Iraq=97we=92ve arguably done O.K. on the ground in = some places,=20 but we=92re totally losing the domestic information battle. = In=20 Afghanistan, it still could go either way.=94

However careful Kilcullen is not to criticize = Administration=20 policy, his argument amounts to a thoroughgoing critique. As = a=20 foreigner who is not a career official in the U.S. = government, he=20 has more distance and freedom to discuss the war on jihadism = frankly, and in ways that his American counterparts rarely = can.=20 =93It=92s now fundamentally an information fight,=94 he = said. =93The enemy=20 gets that, and we don=92t yet get that, and I think that=92s = why we=92re=20 losing.=94

In late September, Kilcullen was one of = the=20 featured speakers at a conference in Washington, organized = by the=20 State and Defense Departments, on bringing the civilian = branches of=20 the government into the global counterinsurgency effort. In = the=20 hallway outside the meeting room, he made a point of = introducing me=20 to another speaker, an anthropologist and Pentagon = consultant named=20 Montgomery McFate. For five years, McFate later told me, she = has=20 been making it her =93evangelical mission=94 to get the = Department of=20 Defense to understand the importance of =93cultural = knowledge.=94 McFate=20 is forty years old, with hair cut stylishly short and an air = of=20 humorous cool. When I asked why a social scientist would = want to=20 help the war effort, she replied, only half joking, = =93Because I=92m=20 engaged in a massive act of rebellion against my hippie=20 parents.=94

McFate grew up in the sixties on a communal houseboat in = Marin=20 County, California. Her parents were friends with Jack = Kerouac and=20 Lawrence Ferlinghetti, and one of her schoolmates was the = daughter=20 of Jefferson Airplane=92s Grace Slick and Paul Kantner. Like = Kilcullen, she was drawn to the study of human conflict and = also its=20 reality: at Yale, where she received a doctorate, her = dissertation=20 was based on several years she spent living among supporters = of the=20 Irish Republican Army and then among British = counterinsurgents. In=20 Northern Ireland, McFate discovered something very like what = Kilcullen found in West Java: insurgency runs in families = and social=20 networks, held together by persistent cultural = narratives=97in this=20 case, the eight-hundred-year-old saga of =93perfidious = Albion.=94 She=20 went on to marry a U.S. Army officer. =93When I was little = in=20 California, we never believed there was such a thing as the = Cold=20 War,=94 McFate said. =93That was a bunch of lies that the = government fed=20 us to keep us paranoid. Of course, there was a thing called = the Cold=20 War, and we nearly lost. And there was no guarantee that we = were=20 going to win. And this thing that=92s happening now is, = without taking=20 that too far, similar.=94 After September 11th, McFate said, = she=20 became =93passionate about one issue: the government=92s = need to=20 actually understand its adversaries,=94 in the same way that = the=20 United States came to understand=97and thereby = undermine=97the Soviet=20 Union. If, as Kilcullen and Crumpton maintain, the = battlefield in=20 the global counterinsurgency is intimately local, then the = American=20 government needs what McFate calls a =93granular=94 = knowledge of the=20 social terrains on which it is competing.

In 2004, when McFate had a fellowship at the Office of = Naval=20 Research, she got a call from a science adviser to the Joint = Chiefs=20 of Staff. He had been contacted by battalion commanders with = the 4th=20 Infantry Division in a violent sector of the Sunni Triangle, = in=20 Iraq. =93We=92re having a really hard time out here=97we = have no idea how=20 this society works,=94 the commanders said. =93Could you = help us?=94 The=20 science adviser replied that he was a mathematical = physicist, and=20 turned for help to one of the few anthropologists he could = find in=20 the Defense Department.

For decades, the Pentagon and the humanistic social = sciences have=20 had little to do with each other. In 1964, the Pentagon set = up a=20 program called, with the self-conscious idealism of the = period,=20 Project Camelot. Anthropologists were hired and sent abroad = to=20 conduct a multiyear study of the factors that promote = stability or=20 war in certain societies, beginning with Chile. When news of = the=20 program leaked, the uproar in Chile and America forced = Defense=20 Secretary Robert McNamara to cancel it. =93The Department of = Defense=20 has invested hardly any money in conducting ethnographic = research in=20 areas where conflict was occurring since 1965,=94 McFate = told me.=20 After Project Camelot and Vietnam, where social scientists = often did=20 contract work for the U.S. military, professional = associations=20 discouraged such involvement. (=93Academic anthropologists = hate me for=20 working with D.O.D.,=94 McFate said.) Kilcullen, who calls=20 counterinsurgency =93armed social science,=94 told me, = =93This is=20 fundamentally about the broken relationship between the = government=20 and the discipline of anthropology. What broke that = relationship is=20 Vietnam. And people still haven=92t recovered from that.=94 = As a result,=20 a complex human understanding of societies at war has been = lost.=20 =93But it didn=92t have to be lost,=94 McFate said. During = the Second=20 World War, anthropologists such as Margaret Mead, Gregory = Bateson,=20 Geoffrey Gorer, and Ruth Benedict provided the Allied war = effort=20 with essential insights into Asian societies. Gorer and = Benedict=20 suggested, for example, that the terms of Japan=92s = surrender be=20 separated from the question of the emperor=92s abdication, = because the=20 emperor was thought to embody the country=92s soul; doing so = allowed=20 the Japanese to accept unconditional surrender. McFate sees = herself=20 as reaching back to this tradition of military-academic = co=F6peration.=20

By 2004, the military desperately needed co=F6peration. = McFate saw=20 Americans in Iraq make one strategic mistake after another = because=20 they didn=92t understand the nature of Iraqi society. In an = article in=20 Joint Force Quarterly, she = wrote, =93Once=20 the Sunni Ba=92thists lost their prestigious jobs, were = humiliated in=20 the conflict, and got frozen out through = de-Ba=92thification, the=20 tribal network became the backbone of the insurgency. The = tribal=20 insurgency is a direct result of our misunderstanding the = Iraqi=20 culture.=94 In the course of eighteen months of interviews = with=20 returning soldiers, she was told by one Marine Corps = officer, =93My=20 marines were almost wholly uninterested in interacting with = the=20 local population. Our primary mission was the security of = Camp=20 Falluja. We relieved soldiers from the 82nd Airborne = Division, and=20 their assessment was that every local was participating or = complicit=20 with the enemy. This view was quickly adopted by my unit and = framed=20 all of our actions (and reactions).=94 Another marine told = McFate that=20 his unit had lost the battle to influence public opinion = because it=20 used the wrong approach to communication: =93We were = focussed on=20 broadcast media and metrics. But this had no impact because = Iraqis=20 spread information through rumor. We should have been = visiting their=20 coffee shops.=94

The result of efforts like McFate=92s is a new project = with the=20 quintessential Pentagon name Cultural Operations Research = Human=20 Terrain. It began in the form of a =93ruggedized=94 laptop = computer,=20 loaded with data from social-science research conducted in = Iraq=97such=20 as, McFate said, =93an analysis of the eighty-eight tribes = and=20 subtribes in a particular province.=94 Now the project is = recruiting=20 social scientists around the country to join five-person = =93human=20 terrain=94 teams that would go to Iraq and Afghanistan with = combat=20 brigades and serve as cultural advisers on six-to-nine-month = tours.=20 Pilot teams are planning to leave next spring.

Steve Fondacaro, a retired Army colonel who for a year = commanded=20 the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force in = Iraq, is=20 in charge of the Human Terrain project. Fondacaro sees the = war in=20 the same terms as Kilcullen. =93The new element of power = that has=20 emerged in the last thirty to forty years and has subsumed = the rest=20 is information,=94 he said. =93A revolution happened without = us knowing=20 or paying attention. Perception truly now is reality, and = our=20 enemies know it. We have to fight on the information = battlefield.=94 I=20 asked him what the government should have done, say, in the = case of=20 revelations of abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison. =93You=92re = talking to a=20 radical here,=94 Fondacaro said. =93Immediately be the first = one to tell=20 the story. Don=92t let anyone else do it. That carries so = much=20 strategic weight.=94 He added, =93Iraqis are not shocked by = torture. It=20 would have impressed them if we had exposed it, punished it, = rectified it.=94 But senior military leadership, he said, = remains=20 closed to this kind of thinking. He is turning for help to=20 academics=97to =93social scientists who want to educate = me,=94 he said. So=20 far, though, Fondacaro has hired just one anthropologist. = When I=20 spoke to her by telephone, she admitted that the assignment = comes=20 with huge ethical risks. =93I do not want to get anybody = killed,=94 she=20 said. Some of her colleagues are curious, she said; others = are=20 critical. =93I end up getting shunned at cocktail = parties,=94 she said.=20 =93I see there could be misuse. But I just can=92t stand to = sit back and=20 watch these mistakes happen over and over as people get = killed, and=20 do nothing.=94

At the counterinsurgency conference in=20 Washington, the tone among the uniformed officers, civilian=20 officials, and various experts was urgent, almost desperate. = James=20 Kunder, a former marine and the acting deputy of the U.S. = Agency for=20 International Development, pointed out that in Iraq and = Afghanistan=20 =93the civilian agencies have received 1.4 per cent of the = total=20 money,=94 whereas classical counterinsurgency doctrine says = that=20 eighty per cent of the effort should be nonmilitary. During = Vietnam,=20 his agency had fifteen thousand employees; it now has two = thousand.=20 After the end of the Cold War, foreign-service and aid = budgets were=20 sharply cut. =93Size matters,=94 Kunder said, noting that = throughout the=20 civilian agencies there are shortages of money and = personnel. To=20 staff the embassy in Baghdad, the State Department has had = to steal=20 officers from other embassies, and the government can=92t = even fill=20 the provincial reconstruction teams it has tried to set up = in Iraq=20 and Afghanistan. While correcting these shortages could not = have=20 prevented the deepening disaster in Iraq, they betray the=20 government=92s priorities.

In early 2004, as Iraq was beginning to unravel, Senator = Richard=20 Lugar, the Indiana Republican who chairs the Senate Foreign=20 Relations Committee, and Senator Joseph Biden, the Delaware=20 Democrat, introduced legislation for a nation-building = office, under=20 the aegis of the State Department. The office would be able = to tap=20 into contingency funds and would allow cabinet-department = officials,=20 along with congressional staff people and civilian experts, = to carry=20 out overseas operations to help stabilize and rebuild failed = states=20 and societies shattered by war=97to do it deliberately and = well rather=20 than in the ad-hoc fashion that has characterized = interventions from=20 Somalia and Kosovo to Iraq. Lugar envisioned both an = active-duty=20 contingent and a reserve corps.

The bill=92s biggest supporter was the military, which = frequently=20 finds itself forced to do tasks overseas for which civilians = are=20 better prepared, such as training police or rebuilding = sewers. But=20 Colin Powell, then the Secretary of State, and other = Administration=20 officials refused to give it strong backing. Then, in the = summer of=20 2004, the Administration reversed course by announcing the = creation,=20 in the State Department, of the Office of the Coordinator = for=20 Reconstruction and Stabilization; the office was given the=20 imprimatur of National Security Presidential Directive 44. = At the=20 September conference in Washington, Kilcullen held up the = office as=20 a model for how to bring civilians into counterinsurgency: = =93True=20 enough, the words =91insurgency,=92 =91insurgent,=92 and = =91counterinsurgency=92=20 do not appear in N.S.P.D. 44, but it clearly envisages the = need to=20 deploy integrated whole-of-government capabilities in = hostile=20 environments.=94

But the new office was virtually orphaned at birth. = Congress=20 provided only seven million of the hundred million dollars = requested=20 by the Administration, which never made the office a top=20 Presidential priority. The State Department has contributed = fifteen=20 officials who can manage overseas operations, but other = agencies=20 have offered nothing. The office thus has no ability to = co=F6rdinate=20 operations, such as mobilizing police trainers, even as Iraq = and=20 Afghanistan deteriorate and new emergencies loom in places = like=20 Darfur and Pakistan. It has become insiders=92 favorite = example of=20 bureaucratic inertia in the face of glaring need.

Frederick Barton, an expert at the Center for Strategic = and=20 International Studies, a Washington think tank, considers = failures=20 like these to be a prime cause of American setbacks in = fighting=20 global jihadism. =93Hard power is not the way we=92re going = to make an=20 impression,=94 he told me, and he cited Pakistan, where a = huge=20 population, rising militancy, nuclear weapons, and the = remnants of=20 Al Qaeda=92s leadership create a combustible mix. According = to=20 Barton=92s figures, since 2002 America has spent more than = six billion=20 dollars on buttressing the Pakistani military, and probably = a=20 similar amount on intelligence (the number is kept secret). = Yet it=20 has spent less than a billion dollars on aid for education = and=20 economic development, in a country where Islamist madrassas = and=20 joblessness contribute to the radicalization of young = people. On a=20 recent visit to Nigeria, Barton heard that American = propaganda=20 efforts are being outclassed by those of the Iranians and = the=20 Saudis. =93What would Pepsi-Cola or Disney do?=94 he asked. = =93We=92re not=20 thinking creatively, expansively. We are sclerotic, = bureaucratic,=20 lumbering=97you can see the U.S. coming from miles = away.=94

If, as Kilcullen says, the global counterinsurgency is = primarily=20 an information war, one place where American strategy should = be=20 executed is the State Department office of Karen Hughes, the = Under-Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. = Hughes is a=20 longtime Bush adviser from Texas. One of her first missions, = in=20 September, 2005, took her to the Middle East, where her = efforts to=20 speak with Muslim women as fellow-=93moms=94 and religious = believers=20 received poor reviews. Last year, she sent out a memo to = American=20 embassies urging diplomats to make themselves widely = available to=20 the local press, but she also warned them against saying = anything=20 that might seem to deviate from Administration policy. The = choice of=20 a high-level political operative to run the government=92s=20 global-outreach effort suggests that the Bush Administration = sees=20 public diplomacy the way it sees campaigning, with the same = emphasis=20 on top-down message discipline. =93It has this fixation with = strategic=20 communications=97whatever that is,=94 an expert in public = diplomacy with=20 close ties to the State Department told me. =93It=92s just = hokum. When=20 you do strategic communications, it fails, because nothing = gets=20 out.=94 She cited a news report that the Voice of America = wanted to=20 produce on American-funded AIDS=20 programs in Africa. The V.O.A. was told by a government = official=20 that the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS=20 Co=F6rdinator would have to give its approval before = anything could be=20 broadcast. (The decision was later overruled.) =93We=92re = spending=20 billions of dollars on AIDS,=94 the=20 expert said=97an effort that could generate considerable = gratitude in=20 African countries with substantial Muslim populations, such = as=20 Somalia and Nigeria. =93But no one in Africa has a = clue.=94

After the Cold War, the government closed down the United = States=20 Information Service and, with it, a number of libraries and = cultural=20 centers around the world. Since September 11th, there has = been an=20 attempt to revive such public diplomacy, but, with American=20 embassies now barricaded or built far from city centers, = only the=20 most dedicated local people will use their resources. To = circumvent=20 this problem, the State Department has established what it = calls=20 American Corners=97rooms or shelves in foreign libraries = dedicated to=20 American books and culture. =93It=92s a good idea, but = they=92re small and=20 marginal,=94 the expert said. She recently visited the = American Corner=20 in the main library in Kano, Nigeria, a center of Islamic = learning.=20 =93I had to laugh,=94 she said. =93A few Africans asleep at = the switch, a=20 couple of computers that weren=92t working, a video series = on George=20 Washington that no one was using.=94 She mentioned one = encouraging new=20 example of public diplomacy, funded partly by Henry = Crumpton=92s=20 office: Voice of America news broadcasts will begin airing = next=20 February in the language of Somalia, a country of increasing = worry=20 to counterterrorism officials. In general, though, there is = little=20 organized American effort to rebut the jihadist conspiracy = theories=20 that circulate daily among the Muslims living in populous = countries=20 such as Indonesia, Pakistan, and Nigeria.

According to the expert, an American diplomat with years = of=20 experience identified another obstacle to American outreach. = =93Let=92s=20 face it,=94 he told her. =93All public diplomacy is on hold = till George=20 Bush is out of office.=94

I once asked David Kilcullen if he = thought that=20 America was fundamentally able to deal with the global = jihad. Is a=20 society in which few people spend much time overseas or = learn a=20 second language, which is impatient with chronic problems, = whose=20 vision of war is of huge air and armor battles ended by the = signing=20 of articles of surrender, and which tends to assume that = everyone is=20 basically alike cut out for this new =93long war=94?

Kilcullen reminded me that there was a precedent for = American=20 success in a sustained struggle with a formidable enemy. = =93If this is=20 the Cold War=97if that analogy holds=97then right now = we=92re in, like,=20 1953. This is a long way to go here. It didn=92t all happen=20 overnight=97but it happened.=94 The Cold War, he emphasized, = was many=20 wars, constructed in many different models, fought in many = different=20 ways: a nuclear standoff between the superpowers, = insurgencies in=20 developing countries, a struggle of ideas in Europe. =93Our = current=20 battle is a new Cold War,=94 Kilcullen said, =93but it=92s = not monolithic.=20 You=92ve got to define the enemy as narrowly as you can get = away=20 with.=94

President Bush has used the Cold War as an inspirational = analogy=20 almost from the beginning of the war on terror. Last month, = in Riga,=20 Latvia, he reminded an audience of the early years of the = Cold War,=20 =93when freedom=92s victory was not so obvious or = assured.=94 Six decades=20 later, he went on, =93freedom in Europe has brought peace to = Europe,=20 and freedom has brought the power to bring peace to the = broader=20 Middle East.=94 Bush=92s die-hard supporters compare him to = Harry S.=20 Truman, who was reviled in his last years in office but has = been=20 vindicated by history as a plainspoken visionary.

An Administration official pointed out that the = President=92s=20 speeches on the war are like the last paragraph of every = Churchill=20 speech from the Second World War: a soaring peroration about = freedom, civilization, and darkness. But in Churchill=92s = case, the=20 official went on, nineteen pages of analysis, = contextualization, and=20 persuasion preceded that final paragraph. A Bush speech = gives only=20 the uplift=97which suggests that there is no strategy beyond = it.=20 Bush=92s notion of a titanic struggle between good and evil, = between=20 freedom and those who hate freedom, recalls the rigid = anti-Communism=20 of Whittaker Chambers, William F. Buckley, Jr., and Barry = Goldwater.=20 Montgomery McFate noted that the current avatars of = right-wing Cold=20 Warriors, the neoconservatives, have dismissed all Iraqi = insurgents=20 as =93dead enders=94 and =93bad people.=94 Terms like = =93totalitarianism=94 and=20 =93Islamofascism,=94 she said, which stir the American = historical=20 memory, mislead policymakers into greatly increasing the = number of=20 our enemies and coming up with wrongheaded strategies = against them.=20 =93That=92s not what the insurgents call themselves,=94 she = said. =93If you=20 can=92t call something by its name=97if you can=92t say, = =91This is what=20 this phenomenon is, it has structure, meaning, = agency=92=97how can you=20 ever fight it?=94 In other words, even if we think that a = jihadi in=20 Yemen has ideas similar to those of an Islamist in Java, we = have to=20 approach them in discrete ways, both to prevent them from = becoming a=20 unified movement and because their particular political = yearnings=20 are different.

Kilcullen is attempting to revive a strain of Cold War = thought=20 that saw the confrontation with Communism not primarily as a = blunt=20 military struggle but as a subtle propaganda war that = required deep=20 knowledge of diverse enemies and civilian populations. By = this=20 standard, America=92s performance against radical Islamists = thus far=20 is dismal. Bruce Hoffman, of Georgetown University, a former = RAND Corporation analyst who began = to use the=20 term =93global counterinsurgency=94 around the same time as = Kilcullen,=20 pointed to two Cold War projects: RAND=92s study of the motivation = and morale of=20 the Vietcong in the mid-sixties, based on extensive = interviews with=20 prisoners and former insurgents, which led some analysts to = conclude=20 that the war was unwinnable; and a survey by Radio Free = Europe of=20 two hundred thousand =E9migr=E9s from the East Bloc in the = eighties,=20 which used the findings to shape broadcasts. =93We haven=92t = done=20 anything like that in this struggle,=94 Hoffman said, and he = cited the=20 thousands of detainees in Iraq. =93Instead of turning the = prisons into=20 insurgent universities, you could have a systematic process = that=20 would be based on scientific surveys designed to elicit = certain=20 information on how people joined, who their leaders were, = how=20 leadership was exercised, how group cohesion was = maintained.=94 In=20 other words, America would get to know its enemy. Hoffman = added,=20 =93Even though we say it=92s going to be the long war, we = still have=20 this enormous sense of impatience. Are we committed to doing = the=20 fundamental spadework that=92s necessary?=94

Kilcullen=92s thinking is informed by some of the key = texts of Cold=20 War social science, such as Eric Hoffer=92s =93The True = Believer,=94 which=20 analyzed the conversion of frustrated individuals into = members of=20 fanatical mass movements, and Philip Selznick=92s =93The = Organizational=20 Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics,=94 which = described=20 how Communists subverted existing social groups and = institutions=20 like trade unions. To these older theoretical guides he adds = two=20 recent studies of radical Islam: =93Globalized Islam,=94 by = the French=20 scholar Olivier Roy, and =93Understanding Terror = Networks,=94 by Marc=20 Sageman, an American forensic psychiatrist and former covert = operator with the mujahideen in Afghanistan. After September = 11th,=20 Sageman traced the paths of a hundred and seventy-two = alienated=20 young Muslims who joined the jihad, and found that the = common ground=20 lay not in personal pathology, poverty, or religious belief = but in=20 social bonds. Roy sees the rise of =93neo-fundamentalism=94 = among=20 Western Muslims as a new identity movement shaped by its = response to=20 globalization. In the margin of a section of Roy=92s book = called =93Is=20 Jihad Closer to Marx Than to the Koran?=94 Kilcullen noted, = =93If=20 Islamism is the new leftism, then the strategies and = techniques used=20 to counter Marxist subversion during the Cold War may have = direct or=20 indirect relevance to combating Al Qaeda-sponsored = subversion.=94

Drawing on these studies, Kilcullen has plotted out a = =93ladder of=20 extremism=94 that shows the progress of a jihadist. At the = bottom is=20 the vast population of mainstream Muslims, who are potential = allies=20 against radical Islamism as well as potential targets of = subversion,=20 and whose grievances can be addressed by political reform. = The next=20 tier up is a smaller number of =93alienated Muslims,=94 who = have given=20 up on reform. Some of these join radical groups, like the = young=20 Muslims in North London who spend afternoons at the local = community=20 center watching jihadist videos. They require =93ideological = conversion=94=97that is, counter-subversion, which Kilcullen = compares to=20 helping young men leave gangs. (In a lecture that Kilcullen = teaches=20 on counterterrorism at Johns Hopkins, his students watch = =93Fight=20 Club,=94 the 1999 satire about anti-capitalist terrorists, = to see a=20 radical ideology without an Islamic face.) A smaller number = of these=20 individuals, already steeped in the atmosphere of radical = mosques=20 and extremist discussions, end up joining local and regional = insurgent cells, usually as the result of a =93biographical=20 trigger=97they will lose a friend in Iraq, or see something = that=20 shocks them on television.=94 With these insurgents, the = full range of=20 counterinsurgency tools has to be used, including violence = and=20 persuasion. The very small number of fighters who are = recruited to=20 the top tier of Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups = are=20 beyond persuasion or conversion. =93They=92re so committed = you=92ve got to=20 destroy them,=94 Kilcullen said. =93But you=92ve got to do = it in such a=20 way that you don=92t create new terrorists.=94

When I asked him to outline a counter-propaganda = strategy, he=20 described three basic methods. =93We=92ve got to create = resistance to=20 their message,=94 he said. =93We=92ve got to co-opt or = assist people who=20 have a counter-message. And we might need to consider = creating or=20 supporting the creation of rival organizations.=94 Bruce = Hoffman told=20 me that jihadists have posted five thousand Web sites that = react=20 quickly and imaginatively to events. In 2004, he said, a = jihadist=20 rap video called =93Dirty Kuffar=94 became widely popular = with young=20 Muslims in Britain: =93It=92s like Ali G wearing a balaclava = and having=20 a pistol in one hand and a Koran in the other.=94 Hoffman = believes=20 that America must help foreign governments and civil-society = groups=20 flood the Internet with persuasively youthful Web sites = presenting=20 anti-jihadist messages=97but not necessarily pro-American = ones, and=20 without leaving American fingerprints.

Kilcullen argues that Western governments should = establish=20 competing =93trusted networks=94 in Muslim countries: = friendly mosques,=20 professional associations, and labor unions. (A favorite = Kilcullen=20 example from the Cold War is left-wing anti-Communist trade = unions,=20 which gave the working class in Western Europe an outlet for = its=20 grievances without driving it into the arms of the Soviet = Union.)=20 The U.S. should also support traditional authority = figures=97community=20 leaders, father figures, moderate imams=97in countries where = the=20 destabilizing transition to modernity has inspired Islamist=20 violence. =93You=92ve got to be quiet about it,=94 he = cautioned. =93You=20 don=92t go in there like a missionary.=94 The key is = providing a social=20 context for individuals to choose ways other than jihad. =

Kilcullen=92s proposals will not be easy to implement at = a moment=20 when the government=92s resources and attention are being = severely=20 drained by the chaos in Iraq. And, if some of his ideas seem = sketchy, it=92s because he and his colleagues have only just = begun to=20 think along these lines. The U.S. government, encumbered by = habit=20 and inertia, has not adapted as quickly to the changing = terrain as=20 the light-footed, mercurial jihadists. America=92s many = failures in=20 the war on terror have led a number of thinkers to conclude = that the=20 problem is institutional. Thomas Barnett, a military = analyst,=20 proposes dividing the Department of Defense into two = sections: one=20 to fight big wars and one for insurgencies and = nation-building.=20 Lawrence Wilkerson, a retired Army colonel and Colin = Powell=92s former=20 chief of staff, goes even further. He thinks that the entire = national-security bureaucracy, which was essentially set in = place at=20 the start of the Cold War, is incapable of dealing with the = new=20 threats and should be overhauled, so that the government can = work=20 faster to prevent conflicts or to intervene early. = =93Especially in=20 light of this Administration, but also other recent ones, do = we=20 really want to concentrate power so incredibly in the White = House?=94=20 he asked. =93And, if we do, why do we still have the = departments,=20 except as an appendage of bureaucracy that becomes an = impediment?=94=20 In Wilkerson=92s vision, new legislation would create a = =93unified=20 command,=94 with leadership drawn from across the civilian = agencies,=20 which =93could supplant the existing bureaucracy.=94

Since September 11th, the government=92s traditional = approach to=20 national security has proved inadequate in one area after = another.=20 The intelligence agencies habitually rely on satellites and = spies,=20 when most of the information that matters now, as Kilcullen = pointed=20 out, is =93open source=94=97available to anyone with an = Internet=20 connection. Traditional diplomacy, with its emphasis on = treaties and=20 geopolitical debates, is less relevant than the ability to=20 understand and influence foreign populations=97not in their = councils=20 of state but in their villages and slums. And future enemies = are=20 unlikely to confront the world=92s overwhelming military = power with=20 conventional warfare; technology-assisted insurgency is = proving far=20 more effective. At the highest levels of Western = governments, the=20 failure of traditional approaches to counter the jihadist = threat has=20 had a paralyzing effect. =93I sense we=92ve lost the ability = to think=20 strategically,=94 Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge, the former = chief of=20 the British armed forces, has said of his government. He = could have=20 been describing the White House and the Pentagon.

Kilcullen=92s strategic mind, by contrast, seems = remarkably=20 febrile. I could call him at the office or at home at any = hour of=20 the night and he=92d be jotting down ideas in one of his = little black=20 notebooks, ready to think out loud. Kilcullen, Crumpton, and = their=20 colleagues are desperately trying to develop a lasting new = strategy=20 that, in Kilcullen=92s words, would be neither Republican = nor=20 Democratic. Bruce Hoffman said, =93We=92re talking about a = profound=20 shift in mind-set and attitude=94=97not to mention a drastic = change in=20 budgetary and bureaucratic priorities. =93And that may not = be=20 achievable until there=92s a change in Administration.=94 = Kilcullen is=20 now in charge of writing a new counterinsurgency manual for = the=20 civilian government, and early this month he briefed = Condoleezza=20 Rice on his findings in Afghanistan. But his ideas have yet = to=20 penetrate the fortress that is the Bush White House. Hoffman = said,=20 =93Isn=92t it ironic that an Australian is spearheading this = shift,=20 together with a former covert operator? It shows that it=92s = almost=20 too revolutionary for the places where it should be = discussed=97the=20 Pentagon, the National Security Council.=94 At a moment when = the Bush=20 Administration has run out of ideas and lost control, it = could turn=20 away from its =93war on terror=94 and follow a different = path=97one that=20 is right under its nose. 3D""